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Abstract. Introduction. Film offers a valuable mirror to reflect on how we assess our present and past. The
Cold War was one of the most troubled periods in history. Two huge, wealthy, energetic, and creative societies
competed in all areas. During those decades of electric change and development they faced each other with
weapons of ever increasing lethality. The film industry in both countries looked at how the nuclear exchange would
impact in both lands. Over the decades as the weaponry changed, as the patterns of leadership changed, as the
economy of the world evolved, both nations’ film industry painted different images of what Armageddon could
look like. If we compare comparable films, across similar decades, what do we learn of that era and those people?
Methods and Materials. The methods used in the article are comparative, analytical and functional systematic
ones. The materials used are the following: 1) five films of both cultures from different decades; 2) secondary
accounts of contemporary events; 3) secondary reviews of the selected films, and 4) secondary accounts of
parallel incidents. Analysis. With the complex weapons of the Cold War era we certainly need to worry about the
technological imperative and the potential role of accident and unintended consequences. However, we are blessed
that the doom day scenario has not yet erupted. We are most fortunate that the dire warning of many US filmmakers
have not been realized. Indeed with the coming advent of AI technology and 5G communications, we may have
more to fear than ever before. Results. After fifty some years of the Cold War, films continue to project the worst
fears of people. As we review these films across the several decades we see constancy, the films again and again
distrust technology.
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Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, г. Санкт-Петербург, Российская Федерация
Аннотация. Введение. Кинематограф представляет зеркальное отражение того, как народы и государ-
ства воспринимают свои взаимоотношения в прошлом и настоящем. Холодная война была одним из наибо-
лее опасных моментов в мировой истории. Два огромных, богатых, динамичных и креативных государства
соперничали и конкурировали во всех сферах. В течение этих напряженных десятилетий колоссальных техно-
логических изменений оба государства не раз оказывались перед угрозой применения окончательного ору-
жия, которое угрожало самому существованию всего человечества. Киноиндустрия в обеих странах демон-
стрировала, как ядерная гонка может отразиться на каждой из участников конфликта. По мере того как
разрабатывались новые ядерные технологии, сменялась политическая элита и руководство в обеих странах,
по мере того как изменялась мировая экономика в США и СССР, киноиндустрия и в СССР, и в США по-
разному отражала понимание того, как мог бы выглядеть Армагеддон. Если мы проанализируем ключевые
американские и советские фильмы, выпущенные в разные годы на протяжении десятилетий холодной вой-
ны, то сможем многое узнать об этой эпохе постоянной угрозы ядерного конфликта и о людях, находившихся
в состоянии непрерывного страха. В предлагаемой статье рассматриваются наиболее заметные фильмы,
созданные в США. Авторы намерены обратиться к анализу советской кинопродукции по данной теме в
ближайшем будущем. Методы и материалы. В ходе исследования применяются историко-сравнительный
метод, метод анализа и синтеза, а также системный подход. В статье использованы: 1) сценарии художествен-
ных фильмов, выпущенные в США в 1950–1990 гг.; 2) опубликованные источники, связанные с проблемати-
кой холодной войны; 3) научная литература по проблемам идеологической конфронтации в период холод-
ной войны; 4) хронологические обзоры параллельных инцидентов в области ядерных технологий и ядерного
оружия. Т. Хид проанализировал общее направление развития темы возможности возникновения ядерного
конфликта между США и СССР, произвел выборку и анализ основных фильмов для иллюстрации и анализа
инструментария формирования концепции взаимной ответственности обеих стран. А.И. Кубышкин проана-
лизировал взаимосвязь содержания кинопродукции США с реальными историческими факторами и собы-
тиями периода холодной войны, рассмотрел динамику изменения идеологической парадигмы ввиду разви-
тия процесса политической коммуникации и осознания взаимной ответственности за судьбы мира, выразив-
шиеся как в изменении позиций правящих политических кругов США и СССР, так и появлении новых акцен-
тов в художественном творчестве американских кинематографистов.
Ключевые слова: советско-американские отношения, холодная война, угроза ядерного конфликта,
американский кинематограф, кинопропаганда.
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Introduction
Film offers a valuable mirror to reflect on
how we assess our present and past. The Cold
War was one of the most troubled periods in
history. Two huge, wealthy, energetic, and creative
societies competed in all areas. During those
decades of electric change and development, they
faced each other with weapons of ever-increasing
lethality. The film industry in both countries looked
at how the nuclear exchange would impact in both
lands. Over the decades as the weaponry changed,
as the patterns of leadership changed, as the
economy of the world evolved, both nations’ film
industry painted different images of what
Armageddon could look like. If we compare
comparable films, across similar decades, what
do we learn of that era and those people?
Analysis
On the Beach Director Stanley Kramer,
Lomitas Productions, Inc. (1959).
After a nuclear war killed all human life in
the northern hemisphere a US submarine, USS
Sawfish, sailed into Australian waters and docked
in the last nation still sustaining human life. The
American sailors and the Australian citizens all
knew they had only, at best, a few years before
they too would succumb to the radiation illness.
The entire planet would soon be devoid of human
existence.
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As one of the earliest films about nuclear
exchanges, the film gave the viewer few details
of how the war began or how it developed over
time. It vaguely implied it was both the result of
mistakes and technological failures. The film,
while made in 1959, was set in 1964.
How does this tale relate to the history we
know of 1964 and the military technology in place
at that time? Nevile Shute wrote the novel that
lays the basis for the movie in 1957, and Stanley
Kramer shot the film in 1959. So what did they
know of the late 1950s and how well did they
predict the world of 1964?
While both the US and the USSR had nuclear
arms in the thousands by 1964, the ICBM that would
forever change the equation of nuclear terror was
not yet in massive deployment [14, p. 77]. That
missile linked to thermonuclear warheads was the
weapon that posed the first real threat of global
annihilation. The Soviet Union did not yet explode
their Tsar Bomba until 1961 [2]. By late 1950 both
nations relied upon strategic bombers for the bulk of
the nuclear threat and some intermediate missile of
limited range and accuracy. While an exchange of
these weapons would do massive damage a nuclear
winter was not a common fear of military planners.
However, in 1962, we did experience the Cuban
missile crisis, the closest the world ever came to
nuclear war, and neither of the scenarios Nevile Shute
forecast came to pass. When Chairman Khrushchev
stationed nuclear-armed IRBM (Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile) and MRBM (Medium Range
Ballistic Missile) in Cuba both President Kennedy
and Chairman Khrushchev were able to negotiate a
de-escalation of the crisis and resolved the issues
without a nuclear exchange [1; 8].
With the sophisticated weapons of that era,
we certainly need to worry about the technological
imperative and the potential role of accident and
unintended consequences. However, we are
blessed that the doom day scenario has not yet
erupted. We are most fortunate that the dire
warning of both Neville Shute and Stanley Kramer
have not been realized. Indeed with the coming
advent of AI technology and 5G communications,
we may have more to fear than ever before [10].
Fail Safe Director, Sydney Lumet, Columbia
Pictures (1964).
Fail Safe is another nuclear terror movie
that shocks with its surprise ending posited to
maintain world peace.
Again, technology is the ‘bête noire’ of the
story. An American Air Force squadron is flying a
routine training mission when maintenance repair
excites a false signal to a bomber squadron to
proceed to target: Moscow. The title, Fail Safe,
refers to a security procedure that had US bombers
fly to a designated rendezvous point where they
would orbit until they received an affirmative,
secure, coded order to attack their assigned target.
The routine change of a communication module
transmitted a faulty signal to proceed to target. The
one bomber squadron that received that confirmed
attack order flew past their fail safe point and
entered Soviet air space.
Utilizing the US-USSR Hotline, a result of
the Cuban missile crisis, the President of the US
phoned the leader of the USSR. The US President
and Chairman Khrushchev spoke. While they
talked, both could see that Soviet aircraft could
only neutralize a few of the attacking planes.
Likewise, Soviet anti-aircraft missile attacks were
not effective. From the conversation, it was clear
that the Soviet Union was preparing to launch their
forces on a retaliatory strike. In a surprising
development, the US President ordered the US
Air Force to assist Soviet Forces in their attack
on the US B-52’s. Enraged US officers were
shocked at the order, and some refused to execute
the command. Again all the US aircraft were not
shot down.
When US officials were shocked they could
no longer communicate with their aircraft the
President asked Khrushchev if the Soviet were
blocking their communications; after confusion and
apparent conflict on the Soviet side, Khrushchev
admitted they had broken US code and were able
to block communications. The US President
requested that they halt the communications
blackout.
However, even when the blocking sources
were silenced the remaining bombers, following
their standard orders, refused to accept oral
commands to scrub their mission. Also, when a
crew member’s wife went online to plead with
her husband, they continued toward targets.
In a stunning move to protect world peace
and avoid Armageddon, the US President ordered
an American bomber to load their weapons and
fly to New York City at the same time as the US
crews neared Moscow. With both the Soviet
Ambassador to the UN online and the US
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ambassador to the USSR, in Moscow, online the
President ordered the US aircraft over New York
City to drop his weapons on hearing that Moscow
had been destroyed. The assumption was that with
mutual destructions, the casualties would be
limited to both population centers and a total
nuclear exchange would be deterred.
This film was released after the most
frightening event of the Cold War. During the
Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the world stood on
the precipice of nuclear Armageddon and it just
barely survived. This film stunned filmgoers
because they had just recently seen the world
closer than ever to nuclear winter.
How does the technology of 1964 compare
to today’s machinery? First, there is no fail safe
point, no delay for human reflection. With ICBMs
today once the button is pushed the missiles launch
and in 30 minutes, or so, they arrive on target.
Just as all the anti-aircraft technology, planes, and
missiles, could not stop all the planes of 1964 we
could likewise assume that regardless the billions
spent on antimissile systems, some missiles will
reach target. The speed of today’s missiles makes
the promise of a fail safe point quaint.
Perhaps what is more astonishing is that we
have had so few nuclear accidents; Broken Arrow
is a US term for a lost nuclear weapon or an
accident with a nuclear weapon. By 2013 the US
reported thirty-two “Broken Arrows” incidents
and yet not one of these has resulted in a nuclear
explosion [8]. We can only hope that history today
continue to record technology more successful
than fiction writers and filmmakers imagine.
The role of an accident is always a vital
component of the story of history. It is impossible
to think about the technology of weaponry today
without fearing the many possibilities for accident
or mistake. However, the story is one of incredible
luck in looking at history in this regard. Perhaps
the period of the greatest threat to the world for
nuclear exchange was the Cuban missile crisis of
1962. During that time Khrushchev placed
medium-range ballistic missiles and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles in Cuba. In response, Pres.
Kennedy ordered the US Navy to quarantine the
island of Cuba. In response to this Khrushchev
ordered Soviet attack submarines to sail to the
island in the protection of the freighter ships that
were carrying the military weaponry to Castro’s
assistance.
The response of the US Navy was to track
those Soviet submarines, to identify them, and to
do all that was necessary to neutralize them. That
did not mean to attack the submarines but rather
to keep them submerged, keeping US warships
on top of them so they would be unable to surface
and recharge their batteries.
The conditions for the Soviet submariners in
such an instance were severe. The Soviet subs
were not used to the impact of tropical waters,
and unbearable interior temperatures resulted in
ships not prepared for such conditions. The crew’s
situation was horrendous. One of the Soviet
submarine Captain’s, Valentin Savitsky, snapped
under the pressure and ordered his men to load the
special weapon torpedo (a nuclear warhead) and
launch it against the American naval forces above
them, particularly the aircraft carrier in their sights.
It was only pure accident that placed on that ship
the Flotilla Commander, Vasili Arkhipov [3]. He
was in charge of the four submarine flotilla. In 1961
he was an officer on K-19; a Soviet sub that lost
the coolant for it’s nuclear reactor, and most of the
men died of radiation sickness as they struggled to
avert a nuclear melt-down. He alone understood
what the horror of a nuclear accident would do.
He countermanded the ship’s Captain and ordered
them to stand down from an attack. It was a pure
accident that put him on that ship, at that time.
Without a doubt, if the Soviets had launched
nuclear weapons against American naval forces,
it would have excited a full nuclear retaliatory
attack by the US against the Soviet Union. So
history has been good to us in blocking against
the horror of nuclear warfare. While numerous
incidents occurred on both side, some extremely
dangerous, our control systems have held to date.
The Day After Director, Nicholas Meyer,
ABC Circle Films (1983 TV movie).
The Day After portrayed a full nuclear
exchange as seen from the American heartland:
Kansas City, Missouri, and Lawrence, Kansas. It has
a special power set in the iconic, pastoral scene of
Middle America. Peaceful farmlands, families
engaged in activities of everyday life, couples lost in
romantic interludes, all belay an impending horror. As
the scene shifts from farm families at lunch, to hospital
wards, to families in their cars, we hear a cacophony
of news bulletins darkening the peaceful skies.
Again with Berlin as the epicenter, East-West
tensions escalated by the hour as violent engagements
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roll across Germany. Combat troops coursed across
former borders. (The film meticulously avoided
blaming one side or the other for instituting the first
strike.) Eventually, tactical nuclear weapons were
released on the battlefield, and that quickly escalated
into a full nuclear exchange. Kansas City was
portrayed as central casting for observing the US
retaliatory response. Offutt Airbase, a B-52 base, is
only 190 miles north of Kansas City and Kansas
Citians watched the massive bomber fly over on
their mission to the USSR.
The most riveting scenes evolved as
Minutemen missiles thundered from the many silos
situated across the farm fields. The exquisite
contrast between the bucolic fields of grain and
the terror weapons of the nuclear age across limpid
blue skies burns into the viewer’s memory.
The first blast, a high burst of an EMP
(nuclear, electronic energy pulse), disabled all
electronics, and electrical engines. All vehicles
froze where they stood. Numerous ground or low
altitude nuclear explosions followed. Kansas City
was leveled, and radiation turned the verdant fields
ashen gray and radioactive dust lingered on all
that survived in the open.
The rest of the film dealt with the death of
societal norms and the individuals battling to re-
create some fraction of society. The scenes of
nuclear devastation are hard to watch, harder to
contemplate as a real possibility. President
Reagan, always the optimist, could not sleep after
watching this film. His comments on nuclear war
changed after his viewing.
However, again, how does this relate to the
realities of the time? During the early 1980s under
Reagan’s administration, we tested the Soviets
as never before with squadrons of B-52s charging
the Soviet border and only turning after driving
the Soviets to disclose all their defensive
capabilities. Even the US Navy sent ships ever
closer to the Soviet shoreline. Reagan’s vastly
increased military budget threatened the Soviet
economy as never before. The Strategic Defense
Initiative, (Star Wars) forced the Soviets to
explode their Defense budget and again delay any
relief to the Soviet consumer.
We all knew of the Cuban missile crisis and
the narrow avoidance of nuclear Armageddon at
that time. However, few know how close we came
to a full-scale nuclear exchange during Operation
Able Archer 83.
In 1983 NATO held its most massive
maneuver yet and marshaled forces as never
before including a mock call up of DEFCON
One [2]. The Soviet leadership heard of the NATO
activities from their intelligence services, and the
Soviet le2ader, Andropov, believing the harsh
rhetoric Reagan used in so many of his public
statements, prepared orders for a surprise nuclear
first strike. It was only, after others in Soviet
leadership cautioned a more careful consideration
did Soviet forces stand down [5].
Again, while the incident came close to
exciting the call to war, other, controlling factors
calmed the waters.
World War III Director Robert Stone, ZDF
(1998).
We have never been fans of counterfactual
history, and this movie does not give us pause to
change our opinion.
World War III, posits that the Soviet coup
of 1991 that detained Chairman Gorbachev
succeeded and Soviet party hardliners took control
of the Soviet Union. This film was originally a
German production, but another edition was
released as an English edition: we observed the
English edition.
A variation on the Armageddon films that
populated the film theaters during the Cold War,
World War III, is perhaps one of the least
successful. It opens with a thermonuclear
exchange that destroys humanity.
After showing M. Gorbachev visiting East
Berlin on its 40th anniversary, October 1989,
Gorbachev returns to Moscow and a Party coup.
He disappears never to surface again, and party
hardliners seize control over the Soviet Union.
(The actual coup attempt took place in August
1991.) The hardliners, as a first action, used
Chinese tactics as seen in Tiananmen Square, and
brutally put down the demonstrators in East
Germany.
NATO responded by rushing reinforcements
to West Berlin. After a political assassination of a
Gorbachev sympathizer, after theater military
leaders threatened military assaults, the Soviet
Union sorted its submarine forces into the Atlantic
and launched their strategic bomber forces to
challenge western borderlands. In support, East
Germany announced a new blockade of Berlin and
warned that any NATO planes would be destroyed
if they attempted to relieve the blockade.
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In response, the US mounted a large naval
convoy to rush massive reinforcements to NATO.
Soshkin, the mythical Soviet leader that took over
from Gorbachev, announced a blockade of Europe
and ordered the Baltic Fleet to interdict the NATO
convoy. The convoy, after suffering significant
casualties, landed in Europe.
Soshkin ordered Warsaw Pact forces to
invade Germany’s northern Baltic coast. The
NATO forces rushed north to defend Germany’s
coast. When those forces moved from the Fulda
gap region, Warsaw forces attacked and drove
NATO forces back.
NATO tactical air forces rallied and
devastated Warsaw military and drove WARSAW
forces back into German, capturing Berlin, and
drove for the Polish border. Soshkin, fearful NATO
would enter Soviet territory ordered a nuclear,
demonstration explosion over the North Sea. The
US went to full nuclear alert and after a Soviet
radar station suffered a malfunction and reported
a massive attack from the US Soshkin launched
of all his strategic missiles. The US detected those
launches and released its arsenal of strategic
weapons. Nuclear winter arrived on the northern
hemisphere. This movie purports to be factual until
the coup and then offer its’ counterfactual account
after the coup succeeds. The film’s producers also
reported they had multiple military advisors on the
set and reviewing the script. Regardless, the film
selectively ignored many events that occurred
before August 1991.
For instance, the Berlin wall fell in November
1989, and by December all communist leaders were
gone in East Germany. However, so much of the
early end days of the Cold war were ignored. In
December 1988, M. Gorbachev delivered a famous
speech at the UN where he announced massive
reductions in the Soviet military: 500,000 men
dismissed from the military, many divisions
withdrawn from WARSAW pact nations and
dissolved, and considerable reductions in all Soviet
offensive weapons in WARSAW pact nations [6,
p. 459]. By the time the movie talks of WARSAW
forces advancing, there were no WARSAW forces.
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Bulgaria even
Romania removed communist governments. In
1990 USSR promised to withdraw all Soviet troops
from Czechoslovakia and Hungary [11].
At the time of the film’s account, there were
no Soviet forces ready to attack NATO, indeed
in August 1990, the Soviet Union agreed to let
unified Germany joined NATO.
Even if you accepted the film’s premise that
none of those Cold War events occurred even
the tale left makes no sense. Of these historical
events that occurred, it is ludicrous to say that the
Soviet Baltic fleet could blockade Europe from a
US naval convoy. The Soviet Baltic fleet was
hardly a blue water navy. At best it was an
assemblage of destroyers and frigates, albeit with
a strong submarine contingent. In 1990 the United
Kingdom alone had three carriers and forty-eight
large surface combatants [12]. More than enough
ships to neutralize any Soviet naval surge. Also,
land-based aircraft, many NATO bases, would
have decimated any Soviet surface fleet with no
air protection.
When M. Gorbachev took office in March-
April 1985, he learned stunningly that the Soviet
economy was but a hollow shell [6, p. 459]. He
knew that he had to decrease military
expenditures; they were bankrupting the nation.
None of this was taken into account in this film.
This entire film is counterfactual.
Thirteen Days Director Roger Donaldson,
Beacon Pictures (2000).
Thirteen Days portrayed the most
dangerous days of the Cold War. The film is
unusual; it uses an actual tape recording of crucial
meetings of White House staff as the script, a
most unusual perspective.
This film, the 2000 year account of the 1962
Cuban mice missile crisis, is a different take on
the Armageddon films we have looked at so far.
This one happened; the world was on the raw
cusp of thermonuclear war. In summer 1962
Chairman Khrushchev was on the Black Sea coast
with Marshall Malinowski, the leader of the Soviet
military, he pointed out to Khrushchev that just
over the horizon lay Turkey and US nuclear
missiles. They could land on Moscow in fifteen
minutes or less. Khrushchev wanted to know why
the USSR could not match the US strategic
advantage such missiles placement provided: so
started Operation Anadyr.
To counter the US advantage with its
forward placement of MRBM (medium-range
ballistic missiles) in Turkey, Italy, and the United
Kingdom, Khrushchev proposed placing Soviet
missiles, both MRBM and IRBM (Intermediate-
range ballistic missile) in Cuba so they could also
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threaten the US population centers in sparse
minutes [4, p. 171]. In 1962 the US had a healthy
lead in ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles),
and while they could reach Soviet targets from
bases in the US, the Soviets could not yet match
that range [14, p. 77].
To counter that US advantage Khrushchev
ordered a vast military build-up on the Caribbean
island with the latest in weaponry: aircraft, anti-
air missiles, a range of tactical nuclear missiles,
four regiments of elite Soviet armored troops, and
many nuclear-armed patrol boats. It was an
incredibly bold and daring adventure he ordered.
He assumed they could land and deploy all the
armaments under utmost secrecy and only reveal
them to the American public when they were all
operational. It would, in one stroke, shift the
correlation of strategic power.
However, Khrushchev was again naive. His
supplies began arriving in Cuba as early as July
1962 and US intelligence quickly discovered the
moment.
Thirteen Days look at this crisis day by day
from the moment President Kennedy was shown
the U-2 photos of the missile sites. Tuesday,
October 16; the CIA shows President Kennedy
the U-2 photos of the missile bases being installed.
The Soviets were indeed installing offensive
strategic missiles in Cuba. When they first saw
the evidence, they could not believe that the Soviets
can be so foolhardy. The US leaders assumed
that Khrushchev would know that the US would
not tolerate such an escalation of the arms race.
The movie portrays each day of the crisis:
thirteen days of nuclear terror. October 16 they
saw Soviet MRBM and knew the entire US
southeast was in the range of the Soviet warheads.
October 17; the President formed an Executive
Committee, EXCOM, to manage the crisis and
they were told that they that IRBM had now been
photographed on the ground in Cuba.
The confirmation of the intermediate-range
ballistic missiles changed the threat profile. It meant
that now the entire US strategic missile forces
were in the range of the Soviet rockets. Only the
extreme northwest, the Seattle region, was out of
range of the Soviet missiles. Now Cuba was being
crisscrossed by reconnaissance aircraft daily.
On October 19; on the fourth day of the
crisis, the decision was made to “quarantine” the
island. It was a blockade, but to use that term
was to declare war: blockades, by international
law, were only allowed as an act of war. The
next day the quarantine went into effect. On
Monday, October 22, Kennedy spoke to the nation
and told them of the situation and announced the
quarantine of the island. Khrushchev, on hearing
of this speech, was furious that their elaborate
scheme to sneak strategic missiles into Cuba was
discovered. He now railed at his military advisers.
As was often the case with Khrushchev, he had
no plan B.
Soon the US and USSR established
backdoor communications. A KGB agent
contacted a friendly news commentator and told
him that the Soviet Union would like to talk. Robert
Kennedy soon set up secret meetings with the
Soviet ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin. Shortly after
those talks were underway, they found a proposal
that will relieve the crisis: the US would pledge
not to invade Cuba and to within six months
withdraw the Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The
Soviet Union would withdraw all its military forces
and equipment from Cuba.
While the negotiations proceeded, there was
still high drama at sea. As the first Soviet ships
approached the line of quarantine, no one knew
what would happen. With so many actors, with
so many weapons cocked and on the highest alert,
anything could go wrong. There was tremendous
jubilation when Soviet ships began to stop and or
turnaround.
Khrushchev was forced to back down from
this extraordinary, bold initiative publicly. Soon
after this event, the party leaders in the Politburo
would move against Khrushchev only this time
they would be successful. As an Armageddon film,
this is an unusual one in that war did not result. In
the tale, we came very close to nuclear exchange
but cool heads, lucidity prevailed in the crisis.
However, if we look at the technology of today,
the weaponry of today, we have to worry.
It was months before the President got
definitive word of the Soviet initiative. After seeing
the U-2 photos, it was days before Kennedy’s
EXCOM committee decided on a course of action:
quarantine. It was days before he could marshal
US forces and address the nation. What of today’s
crisis management systems and the weapon
technology of today? [13] Some weapons, laser
weapons, will flash at the speed of light. How
could we possibly have cool, reflective meetings
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to consider decision options under such threats?
How could any rational process consider possible
alternatives or unintended consequences under
such a time frame? With the lethality of today’s
weapons, how do we assess contending response’s?
Do we now have weapons of such
sophistication that we have no possible mechanisms
to assess the risk and plot the appropriate response?
With the perfusion of AI technology today, many
would call for empowering the computer with the
decision to call for the launching of lethal weapons.
However, that will only terrify many who have grave
doubts about the “wisdom” of automated decision
algorithms [5]. Will we spend as much time
developing mechanisms of decision-making in light
of these new machines as we can spend on
developing the technology war?
Results
After fifty-some years of the Cold War, films
continue to project the worst fears of people. As
we review these films across the several decades
we see constancy; the films, again and again,
distrust technology. They worry about the veniality
of man and assume errors will occur. They offer
a constant litany of heroic, brave men. (Few
women appear as significant figures in these
films.) However, as the war tools mutate and
evolve the films seem unable to deal with the ever-
increasing lethality of today’s war and those we
can image in our near future.
Conclusions
After a review of these films one can be
pessimistic as well as optimistic. While they
constantly depict nuclear explosions and the
incineration of millions, while they repeatedly
record the failure of technology, and while they
continually portray humans crashing under the in
inhuman loads the balance of power requires, we
did, we do survive.
Lightly covered in the films reviewed is the
ever-increasing lethality of contemporary
weapons. In World War II it would take a squadron
of bombers and hundreds of bombs to destroy
one bridge. Now one bomber could carry eight
smart bombs and destroy eight different bridges.
Instead of carpet bombing a city they can target
individual buildings. The attack can even be
launched from a stand-off position well out of the
range of defensive weapons. Often the defender
may not even know they are under attack until
the weapons ignite.
Drones or pilotless aircraft are one of the
latest threats. In 2019 Saudi Arabia’s major
refinery was savaged by a dozen or more drones.
AI (artificial intelligence) no doubt, enabled them
to skillfully fly around Saudi defenses and strike
the complex at its most critical locations and wreak
massive damage. This method of attack can be
done with very slight cost to the attacker. It is a
new, massive threat: asymmetrical warfare [9].
Iran could launch a swarm attack with
drones, air or sea, against US forces in the Persian
Gulf for a slight expense but it would be extremely
expensive for the US to provide adequate defenses
against such an assault [8]. It is the latest version
of David and Goliath.
All the films we reviewed here spoke to the
latest in new threats to peace but the evolution
never stops.
Yet, with all the weaponry, all the trillions,
spent on engines of war we have not yet seen the
mushroom cloud so fantasized in media.
NOTE
1 The reported study was funded by the Russian
Science Foundation, grant number 18-18-02233  “Film
Images of the Soviet and American Enemies in the
Symbolic Politics of the Cold War: Comparative
Analysis”.
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